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Abstract: Austerity measures in many European countries have led to the violation of social 
rights and widespread socio-economic malaise. In the case of countries subjected to 
conditionality imposed by external institutions for the receipt of loans, the resultant harms 
have highlighted responsibility gaps across a range of international institutions. Two recent 
legal developments come together to expose these gaps: Greece’s argument in a series of cases 
under the European Social Charter that it was not responsible for the impact on the right to 
social security brought about by austerity measures since it was only giving effect to its other 
international obligations as agreed with the European Commission, the European Central 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (the Troika), and the concern to emerge from the 
Pringle case before the European Court of Justice that European Union institutions could do 
outside of the EU that which they could not do within the EU – disregard the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in the exercise of their tasks. That the Commission and ECB were in time 
answerable to international organisations set up to provide financial support adds an additional 
layer of responsibility to consider. Taking Greece as a case study and drawing on EU law, 
international human rights law, and the law on the international responsibility of states and of 
international organisations, this article looks to what we can expect in legal terms and as a 
matter of contemporary societal expectation when it comes to having international institutions 
respect human rights. 
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 2 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
The 2008 global financial and economic crisis rolled out across the world revealing 
systemic flaws in national and international monetary and financial architecture. It 
was accompanied by massive social harms that have by now been well-
documented, although far from resolved.1 The impacts of the crisis have affected 
countries in all regions of the world, but for a variety of reasons certain countries 
weathered the upheaval of their economies better than others.2 While economists 
may take different views on what the best course of action is under conditions of 
recession, from 2010 the advocates of austerity were most influential in 
determining the measures taken as a response to economic difficulties as seen, for 
example, in the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as in the eurozone 
countries of Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy. In the developing world, the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) reports of ‘pre-emptive’ austerity 
measures having been taken.3 Austerity as a response to recession has been widely 
criticized by economists, a point to which we return at the end of the paper. 
Austerity measures have also had devastating effects on the exercise of human 
rights in Europe, including notably social rights.  
Using Greece as a case study, this paper advances two central arguments. 
First, that the governance of the crises in the European Union (EU) has led to 
massive violations of human rights. Second, that the way in which the crises have 
been governed has exposed a series of black holes when it comes to accountability 
for the violation of human rights. The way the crises have been governed 
challenges not only the substantive content of human rights law constitutionally, 
supranationally and internationally, but notably the very idea that there should be a 
clear line of responsibility when it comes to the protection of human rights. The 
legal implications of this can be illustrated by reference to the litigation before the 
Council of Europe’s European Committee of Social Rights regarding the 
                                                     
1 ‘The financial crisis, which began in the United States, then spread to Europe, has now become global. 
[…] It is important to recognize that what began as a crisis in the financial sector has now become an 
economic crisis. But, it is not only an economic crisis, it is also a social crisis.’ Report of Commission of 
Experts of the President of the General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial Systems 
(Stiglitz Report) (21 Sept. 2009) 12; see further, ILO’s Global Employment Trends 2014; Risks of Jobless 
Recovery (International Labour Organization, 21 Jan. 2014). 
2 Krugman citing the work of Belgian economist Paul DeGrauwe suggests in general that ‘the crucial 
difference […] seemed to be whether countries had their own currencies. Such countries can’t run out of 
money because they can print it if needed, and absent the risk of a cash squeeze, advanced nations are 
evidently able to carry quite high levels of debt without crisis.’  P. Krugman, How the Case for Austerity 
has Crumbled' Vol LX, No 10, New York Review of Books (6 June 2013) 67, at 72. As for developing 
countries, the Stiglitz Report remarks: ‘While developed countries have the fiscal flexibility to respond, to 
stimulate their economies, to shore up failing financial institutions, to provide credit, and to strengthen 
social protections, most developing countries have tighter budget constraints, and resources directed 
towards offsetting the impact of the crisis must be diverted from development purposes’. Report of 
Commission of Experts of the President of the General, supra n. 1, 13. Greece, the subject of this article, seems to 
have suffered from both sets of constraints, a point addressed subsequently herein. 
3 ILO, World of Work Report 2012: Better Jobs for a Better Economy (ILO/International Institute for Labour 
Studies, 2012) viii. 
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violations of social rights in Greece. The conditionality imposed on Greece by the 
European Commission (Commission or EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – the so-called Troika – for receipt of 
loans, challenges conventional wisdom as to the role and capacity of the state. The 
disregard not only of substantive rights protection but of the very idea of state 
responsibility: of the state as the institution through which rights are protected and 
of the state as the entity that is liable for a failure to perform its human rights 
duties, are key stories to emerge from the response to the crisis in Greece. The 
extraterritorial obligations of eurozone states to the people of Greece is another 
story to emerge from the austerity crisis. And at the pinnacle of this account sits 
the absence of international legal responsibility of international institutions 
including the European Commission, the ECB, the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), and the IMF – so deeply implicated in the human rights harms that have 
come to pass in the name of saving Greece.  
This article proceeds as follows: Part II provides an overview of the initial 
financial assistance mechanisms put in place for Greece and the concerns and 
impact of the conditionality measures tied to the assistance. Part III considers the 
case against Greece before the Social Rights Committee and the nature and 
content of the conditionality. In this section, links and lessons are drawn to the 
economic conditionality required by international financial institutions over the 
past decades in other parts of the world and queries the IMF’s alleged turn to 
country ‘ownership’ and social impact assessment. Part IV looks to EU law to 
explore the legal issues around whether the EU institutions – the European 
Commission and the ECB – can be bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
in relation to their conduct under the ESM, an international organisation 
established outside of the EU legal order. Part V looks to international law to 
consider the human rights obligations and legal responsibility of the ESM itself, 
the IMF and their respective Member States, including their extraterritorial 
obligations under the United Nations (UN) International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. In considering the issues of jurisdiction and 
international responsibility a range of different rights and relevant international 
sources are highlighted – in particular the right to social security under the 
European Social Charter (‘social rights’); the protection of collective bargaining, 
fair and just working conditions, the entitlement to social security and social 
assistance, and access to health care, as well as the protection of human dignity 
and the right to life under the  EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘fundamental 
rights’); and a number of ‘human rights’ provided for in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including the rights to work, 
to housing and to health. Drawing inspiration from central human rights doctrines 
to have emerged from the latter source, Part VI addresses what international 
institutions influencing the terms of conditionality in recipient countries should be 
expected to take on board in order to seek to avoid human rights harms in the 
exercise of their tasks. Part VII highlights how austerity has been widely 
condemned on its own terms as a response to recession, and indicates moreover 
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that securing socio-economic rights (however named) offers a stronger foundation 
for macro-economic performance as well as for the sharing of its gains. Part VIII 
offers some concluding remarks, including by drawing attention to some legal 
questions that lie ahead in this area. 
 
 
 
II ‘SAVING’ GREECE4 
 
Greece was at the forefront of an early austerity intervention back in 2010 in order 
to address its sovereign debt which had been masked for years by the previous 
government (including with the help of Goldman Sachs5) and was exposed as part 
of the wider crisis.6 Due to its near financial collapse, its status as a eurozone 
country and the concern over contagion that could affect other eurozone 
economies, since May 2010 the eurozone Member States and the IMF have been 
providing financial support that would ‘save’ Greece.7  
A joint mission to Athens by the Troika took place from 21 April to 3 May 
2010 following a request for international financial assistance from Greece.8 The 
financial assistance agreed by eurozone Member States was part of a joint package 
along with the IMF.9 This financial rescue operation for Greece was launched 
immediately prior to the adoption of two temporary assistance facilities – the 
European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial 
                                                     
4 I borrow this tongue in cheek expression from the revolutionary work of J. McMurtry, ‘The 2008—
2013 Crisis as Metastasis. A Preview of the 2nd edition of The Cancer Stage of Capitalism by Pluto 
Press’, 8 Nordicum-Mediterraneum 1 (2013). 
5 See the account by Michael Lewis: In 2001 ‘Goldman Sachs […] engaged in a series of apparently legal 
but nonetheless repellent deals designed to hide the Greek government’s true level of indebtedness. For 
these trades Goldman Sachs – which, in effect, handed Greece a $1 billion loan – carved out a reported 
$300 million in fees. The machine that enabled Greece to borrow and spend at will was analogous to the 
machine created to launder the credit of the American subprime borrower – and the role of the American 
investment banker in the machine was the same’. M. Lewis, Boomerang (Penguin, 2012) 62-63.  
6 ‘Cheap credit rolled across the planet between 2002 and 2007 – entire countries were told the lights are 
out, do what you want, no one will know.’ ibid., 42.  
7 ‘On 2 May [2010] the [EC/ECB/IMF] mission concluded a staff level agreement for a joint euro area / 
IMF financing package of EUR 110 billion and supporting economic policies. On the same day the 
Eurogroup agreed to activate stability support to Greece via bilateral loans centrally pooled by the 
European Commission. On 9 May the IMF executive board approved a Stand-By Arrangement. On 18 
May 2010, the euro area Member States disbursed their first instalment of EUR 14.5 bn of a pooled loan 
to Greece, following a disbursement of EUR 5.5 bn from the IMF.’ European Economy, The Economic 
Adjustment Programme for Greece, European Commission Occasional Papers 61/May 2010, 1. 
8 ibid.  
9 European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs: Greece, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/countries/greece_en.htm. ‘As reflected in Council 
conclusions and the inter-creditor agreement of the 15 lending euro area Member States, signed on 9 May 
2010, the Commission will coordinate and implement the programme on behalf and under the instruction 
of the euro area Member States and provide the support, including negotiation and signing with Greece, 
of a Loan Facility Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding regarding policy conditionality.’ 
European Economy, The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, supra n. 7, 26. IMF approval comes by way 
of its Executive Board. ibid., 9. 
  
Margot E. Salomon                         Of Austerity, Human Rights and International Institutions  
 
 5 
Stability Facility (EFSF), with the latter then constituting the financial assistance 
facility for Greece from 2012. The EFSM was established by a European Council 
Regulation in May 2010, with the EFSF established outside the EU legal 
framework as a public limited liability company governed by the laws of 
Luxembourg, but with the same essential functions and purpose as the ESFM and 
with eurozone Members States as shareholders constituting the Board of 
Directors.10 Both have been replaced by the European Stability Mechanism, the 
permanent crisis resolution mechanism for the countries of the euro. While the 
EFSF will remain active in financing the ongoing programmes for Portugal, 
Ireland and Greece, as of 1 July 2013 the EFSF may no longer engage in new 
financing programmes or enter into new loan facility agreements and as of 1 July 
2013 the activities of the EFSF will be carried out by the ESM staff.11 The ESM 
will be the sole and permanent mechanism for responding to new requests for 
financial assistance by eurozone Member States.12 Significantly, the governance of 
the EFSF, like the ESM, is a Board of Directors comprised now of the 18 
eurozone States.13 Like the ESM, the Commission and ECB attend as observers. 
This article focuses largely on the ESM, which was at the centre of the first 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) case on the debt crisis and its consideration 
exposes a range of legal gaps when it comes to the human rights issues that 
underpin this article. By way of note, the legal arguments presented as per the 
ESM and its Member States would also apply at a minimum to the eurozone 
Member States implicated in the establishment and governance of the EFSF.  
The proclaimed aims of the financial assistance an ‘adjustment’ were to 
redress imbalances in public finances, reduce Greece’s external debt, and restore 
                                                     
10 EFSF Consolidated Articles of Association: ‘The object of the company will be to facilitate or provide 
financing to Member States of the European Union in financial difficulties whose currency in the Euro 
and which have entered into a memorandum of understanding with the European Commission 
containing policy conditionality’ (Art. 3). ‘The Company is managed by a Board of Directors consisting of 
as many Directors as there are shareholders’ (Art. 10.1). The European Commission and European 
Central Bank are each entitled to appoint an observer who may take part in the meetings of the Board of 
Directors but do not have the power to vote (Art. 11.11), available at: 
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/EFSFStatusCoordonnes%2023AVRL2014.pdf; and see the 
EFSF Framework Agreement between the ' "euro-area Member States" or "EFSF shareholders" and the 
European Financial Stability Facility'', available at: 
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/20111019_efsf_framework_agreement_en.pdf;  see further, B. 
de Witte and T. Beukers, ‘The Court of Justice Approves the Creation of the European Stability 
Mechanism Outside the EU Legal Order’ 50 Common Market Law Review (2013) 805. 
11 See online at: http://www.efsf.europa.eu/.  
12 ESM Treaty, preambular para. 1: ‘[…] This European Stability Mechanism (“ESM”) will assume the 
tasks currently fulfilled by the European Financial Stability Facility (“EFSF”) and the European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism (“EFSM”) in providing, where needed, financial assistance to euro area Member 
States.’ Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism Between the Kingdom of Belgium, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, Ireland, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of 
Spain, the French Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, 
the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Finland, 2 Feb. 2012 European Communication DOC/12/3, 
available at: http://www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/esm_treaty_en.pdf [hereinafter ESM Treaty]. 
13 Latvia adopted the euro in January 2014 and became the 18th Member of the ESM on 13 Mar. 2014. 
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Greece’s competitiveness.14 These measures, shaped by austerity economics, were 
meant to serve a higher good – the public interest – by preventing economic 
collapse and restoring the economy. The Troika pursued reforms even if the 
approach taken to strengthening the economy and meeting their range of stated 
objectives have been widely challenged on their own terms. What occurred 
alongside the adjustments is, and remains, widespread social malaise including for 
the most socially and economically vulnerable in Greece. By its own estimation, 
the IMF concluded in its report of May 2013 on Greece that ‘the burden of 
adjustment was not shared evenly across society’.15  
Support for Greece from the Troika has been conditional on what two 
authors sum up as reductions in public spending, drastic labour market reform, 
and ‘a welfare state retrenchment unprecedented in the post-war period’.16 The 
impact of the measures on jobs, pay, conditions and services has been extensive.17 
Early research on austerity measures and labour market reform in Greece 
highlighted that the structural reforms imposed had ‘severely weakened the role of 
trade unions and social policy institutions, resulting in an almost full 
commodification of labour’.18 Recent findings indicate that unemployment rose 
sharply, from 6.6 per cent in May 2008 to 27.6 per cent in April 2013, with young 
women facing massive unemployment at 50.2 per cent and young men faring little 
better at 43.5 per cent.19 In the informal sectors of construction, agriculture and 
tourism earnings will have declined even more.20 By 2012 both poverty and 
inequality had increased significantly driven primarily by the rise in unemployment, 
with 58 per cent of the unemployed living on incomes below the 2009 poverty 
line.21 In line with the loan requirements to reduce the budget deficit, measures 
                                                     
14 ‘The government is fully committed to the policies stipulated in this document and its attachments, to 
frame tight budgets in the coming years with the aim to reduce the fiscal deficit to below 3 percent in 
2014 and achieve a downward trajectory in the public debt-GDP ratio beginning in 2013, to safeguard the 
stability of the Greek financial system, and to implement structural reforms to boost competitiveness and 
the economy’s capacity to produce, save, and export.’ IMF, Greece: Memorandum of Economic and 
Financial Policies (3 May 2010); IMF, Greece: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial 
Policies (15 Mar. 2012); see also, the Government in Pensioners' Union of the Agricultural Bank of Greece 
(ATE) v Greece, European Committee of Social Rights, Complaint, Complaint No. 80/2012 16 Jan. 2012, 
para. 62.  
15 Greece: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access under the 2010 Stand-By Arrangement, IMF Country Report 
No. 13/156 (May 2013) para. 47. 
16 A. Koukiadaki and L. Kretsos, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box: The Sovereign Debt Crisis and Labour Market 
Regulation in Greece’ 41 Industrial Law Journal 3 (2012) 276, at 276-277. 
17 D. Hall, ‘Greece’ Cuts Watch Brief, Business School, University of Greenwich (Nov. 2011), available at: 
http://www.psiru.org/sites/default/files/greece-cwbrief-Nov2011.pdf; D. Stuckler and S. Basu, The Body 
Economic: Eight Experiments in Economic Recovery from Iceland to Greece (Penguin Books, 2013) 77-94. 
18 See Koukiadaki and Kretsos, supra n. 16, 277. Measures consistent with the neoliberal hostility to trade 
unions understood as posing an interference with the smooth operation of the labour market. C. Crouch, 
The Strange Non-death of Neo-liberalism (Polity Press, 2011) 18. 
19 M. Matsaganis, The Greek Crisis: Social Impact and Policy Responses, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Nov. 2013) 5. 
20 ibid., 9. 
21 ibid., 12-13; ‘In numerical terms, there were 2.5 million people living in poverty in 2012, an increase of 
nearly 190,000 people in one year.’ A. Leahy, S. Healy and M. Murphy, The European Crisis and its Human 
Cost, Crisis Monitoring Report 2014 (Caritas Europa, 2014), 32. 
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included ‘an increase in VAT and pension reforms, a cut in public sector wages, a 
30% cut in special bonuses (e.g. holiday and Christmas bonus), a reduction in 
overtime pay and the suspension of recruitment of new workers’.22 By 2013 only 
one in five unemployed person received unemployment benefits.23 Cuts to 
spending on medication and outpatient pharmaceuticals were also requirements.24 
Access to basic health services was curtailed including by the introduction of user-
fees25 with a report of 2013 citing the collapse of public health programmes 
because of austerity.26 Findings published in 2014 conclude that the inability to 
obtain care increased most for older people27 and link a rise in depression and 
attempted suicide to the economic hardship in Greece.28 Notably, privatisation of 
public sector operations as part of the fundraising drive is a core aspect of the 
measures required. The list of those operations to be partly or wholly privatized in 
Greece includes: water services, rail, gas, mobile telecoms, airports, motorways and 
the state electricity company,29 policies characterised by one commentator as a 
providing a ‘massive transfer of wealth form the public to the private sector 
through privatizations of public enterprises’.30 The IMF offers the following 
corroboration:  
 
To restore competitiveness and growth, we will accelerate implementation of 
far reaching structural reforms in the labor, product, and service markets. […] 
                                                     
22 Hall, supra n. 17. 
23 Matsaganis, supra n, 19, 34. 
24 Stuckler and Basu, supra n. 17, 84: ‘The IMF’s agreement with the Greek government specifically called 
for a “target to reduce public spending on outpatient pharmaceuticals from 1.9 to 1 and 1/3 percent of 
GDP” ’. A. Kentikelenis, M. Karanikolos, I. Papanicolas, S. Basu, M. McKee and D. Stuckler, ‘Health and 
the Financial Crisis in Greece — Authors' Reply’, 379 The Lancet 3 (17 Mar. 2012) 1002: ‘[R]esearchers at 
the National School of Public Health reported that “spending by Greeks on health is falling 36 percent” 
in 2011, from €25 billion to about €16 billion. Signs of further cuts are ahead, since the International 
Monetary Fund attributed Greece's recent failure to reach deficit reduction targets partly on the inability 
to reduce hospital expenditures.’ 
25 ‘In 2011, user fees were increased from €3 to €5 for outpatient visits (with some exemptions for 
vulnerable groups), and co-payments for certain medicines have increased by 10% or more dependent on 
the disease.’  A. Kentikelenis, M. Karanikolos, A. Reeves, M. McKee and D. Stuckler ‘Greece’s Health 
Crisis: From Austerity to Denialism’ 389 The Lancet (2014) 748, at 749; and further, Report of the United 
Nations Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial 
obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural 
rights, Mission to Greece (22-27 April 2013), UN Doc. A/HRC/25/50/Add.1, paras. 40-83.  
26 Stuckler and Basu, supra n. 17, 86. 
27 Kentikelenis et al., supra n. 25, 749. 
28 ‘Findings from population surveys suggest a 2.5 times increased prevalence of major depression, from 
3.3% in 2008 to 8.2% in 2011, with economic hardship being a major risk factor. Investigators of another 
study reported a 36% increase between 2009 and 2011 in the number of people attempting suicide in the 
month before the survey, with a higher likelihood for those experiencing substantial economic 
distress.’(Footnotes removed). ibid., 750. 
29 Hall, supra n. 17. ‘The process is being managed by a specially created private company overseen by EU 
appointees, with quarterly targets for the amounts to be sold. The proceeds are expected to be used to 
pay off the west European banks who hold Greek bonds.’ ibid. On the approach of neoliberal policy to 
privatisation including ‘natural monopolies’ such as the supply of electricity, gas and water, broadcasting 
and railways, see, Crouch, supra n. 18, 18-21. 
30  G. Katrougalos, ‘The Greek Austerity Measures: Violations of Socio-Economic Rights’, International 
Journal of Constitutional Law Blog, 29 Jan. 2013, available at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/01/the-
greek-austerity-measures-violations-of-socio-economic-rights.   
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To bring the fiscal deficit to a sustainable position, we will implement bold 
structural spending and revenue reforms. The adjustment will be achieved 
through permanent expenditure reductions, and measures to this end have 
already been implemented as prior actions. […] We remain committed to our 
ambitious privatization plans.31 
 
The human distress experienced within the country has been widely documented 
and the impact of the austerity measures have formed the basis of a series of 
complaints against Greece decided on by the Council of Europe’s European 
Committee of Social Rights whose task it is to judge that states party comply, in 
law and in practice, with the provisions of the European Social Charter. 
 
 
 
III  CONDITIONALITY AND THE LESSONS OF HISTORY 
 
In a resulting set of decisions against Greece under the 1961 European Social 
Charter32 Greece was found to have violated the right to social security due to its 
austerity measures, as alleged by the complainant.33 In its defence, Greece argued, 
inter alia, that, 'the modifications of the pensioners social protection […] result 
from the Government’s other international obligations, namely those deriving from a 
financial support mechanism agreed upon by the Government together with the 
European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (“the Troika”) in 2010’.34 
The European Committee of Social Rights properly rejects this argument in 
its introductory remarks on the merits. To the Government’s argument that ‘the 
rights safeguarded under the 1961 Charter have been restricted pursuant to [its] 
other international obligations, namely those it has under the loan agreement with 
the EU institutions and the International Monetary Fund’ the Committee replies 
‘that the fact the contested provisions of domestic law seek to fulfil the 
requirements of other legal obligations does not remove them from the ambit of 
                                                     
31 IMF, Greece: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies  (15 Mar. 2012), supra 
n. 14.  
32 The complaint is part of a series of collective complaints concerning the same facts, registered as Nos. 
76/2012 to 80/2012 and on which the European Social Rights Committee provided the same assessment 
and rendered the same decision. 
33 ‘The Committee concludes that the Government has not established, as is required by article 12(3) [of 
the European Social Charter], that efforts have been made to maintain a sufficient level of protection for 
the benefit of the most vulnerable members of society, even though the effects of the adopted measures 
risk bringing about large scale pauperisation of a significant segment of the population […]. The 
Committee holds, […] that due to the cumulative effect of the restrictive measures and the procedures 
adopted to put them in place, they constitute a violation of the Article 12(3) of the 1961 Charter.’ 
Federation of Employed Pensioners of Greece (IKA-ETAM) v Greece, European Committee of Social Rights, 
Decision on the Merits, Complaint No. 76/2012, paras. 81 and 83. 
34 ibid., para. 10. 
  
Margot E. Salomon                         Of Austerity, Human Rights and International Institutions  
 
 9 
the Charter’.35 Drawing on its earlier decision in the case of CGT v France, the 
Committee further notes that ‘[…] both when preparing the text in question 
[pertaining to binding measures] and when implementing it into national law – 
[state parties should] take full account of the commitments they have taken upon 
ratifying the European Social Charter.36 Greece’s subsequent argument was that 
any rights restrictions were the result of the fiscal and structural measures 
undertaken with the purpose of enhancing the competitiveness of the Greek 
economy and the operation of the labour market were laid down in a programme 
‘the observance of which is a prerequisite for the loan instalments as provided by 
the agreement with the Troika’.37 
 It may be questioned as to whether it is the external conditionality itself 
that requires measures that violate certain social rights, or whether it is the way 
they are being implemented nationally in particular policy areas. Of course the 
prospect that it is both is also possible. The IMF explains that its conditionality 
covers both the design of IMF-supported programs—that is, the macroeconomic 
and structural policies—and the specific tools used to monitor progress toward 
the goals outlined by the country in cooperation with the IMF.38 According to the 
IMF, ‘the member country has primary responsibility for selecting, designing, and 
implementing the policies that will make the IMF-supported program 
successful’.39 The recent move by the IMF to national ‘ownership’ is not, however, 
easily reconciled with the ‘specific’ terms and requirements provided for in the 
Memoranda with Greece which are categorical on the extent of Troika oversight 
and explicit in their substantive prescriptions: ‘The [Greek] authorities commit to 
consult with the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF on adoption of 
policies that are not consistent with this memorandum’; ‘Actions for review’ 
include the adoption of reform by Parliament (of the pension system to ensure its 
medium- and long-term sustainability); ‘[…] reform will be designed in close 
                                                     
35 ibid., para. 50. The European Court of Human Rights makes a similar point in Capital Bank AD v 
Bulgaria, judgment of 24 Nov. 2005, no.49429/99: ‘Furthermore, the Government’s reliance on the 
alleged demands by the IMF to limit the courts’ involvement in the closing of ailing banks was misplaced, 
because Bulgaria could not avoid its obligations under the Convention under the guise of complying with 
the recommendations of an international organisation.’ A comparable argument in the  Latvia Pensions 
Case was rejected by the Constitutional Court of Latvia, Decision of 21 Dec. 2009, Case no. 2009-43-01, 
see, ESCR-Justice, Monthly Caselaw Update, Issue 12, June 2010, available at: http://www.escr-
net.org/usr_doc/ESCR-JUSTICE_Issue_12_-_June_2010.pdf: ‘Finally, the Court determined that the 
international creditors had not explicitly stipulated reductions in pension funds, and that these conditions 
had been proposed by Cabinet Ministers, but even if the conditions had been imposed by the creditors, 
the Court stated that conditions “cannot replace the rights established by the Constitution,” and refused 
to recognize loan conditions as a valid argument in support of the law’s reduction of pensions.’ 
36 Federation of Employed Pensioners of Greece (IKA-ETAM) v Greece, supra n. 33, para. 51. Notably, the 
Committee points out that the consolidation of public finances doesn’t by definition violate the right to 
social security, if ‘necessary to ensure the maintenance of a given system of social security and did not 
prevent members of society from continuing to enjoy effective protection against social and economic 
risks’. ibid., para. 71.  
37 ibid., para. 66. 
38 Factsheet, IMF Conditionality, 31 Mar. 2014, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/conditio.htm. 
39 ibid.  
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consultation with European Commission, IMF and ECB staff, and its estimated 
impact on long-term sustainability will be validated by the EU Economic Policy 
Committee’.40 The 2012 Memorandum of Understanding provides that ‘Greece 
commits to consult with the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF staff 
on the adoption of policies falling within the scope of this Memorandum allowing 
sufficient time for review’ and further: ‘Disbursement are subject to quarterly 
reviews of conditionality for the duration of the arrangement.’41 Substantive 
prescriptions include requirements to: ‘Eliminate pension bonuses’; ‘Adopt a 
comprehensive pension reform that reduces the projected increase in public 
spending on pensions’; ‘Prepare a privatization plan for the divestment of state 
assets and enterprises’, and; ‘Public investment reduction’.42 It is under these 
dubious terms that the IMF commitment to ‘national ownership’ is advanced.43 
Moreover, these terms and conditions come after ‘prior action’ policy, that is 
measures that a country agrees to take before the IMF’s Executive Board approves 
financing or completes a review.44 It is indicative that in considering the 
admissibility of a case against Greece for the impact on the right to property of 
austerity measures in the areas of wages and pensions, the European Court of 
Human Rights draws directly on the 2010 Memorandum for information on the 
measures at issue.45  
Protests against the Troika plans in May 2010 had Greek protestors call for a 
nationwide referendum on the pending agreements, but the austerity package went 
into effect in May 2010 without a vote, as was the case with a subsequent 
attempt.46 As Katrougalos concludes, ‘The Memoranda imply that the Troika has 
decision-making power for defining and implementing economic, financial and 
social policies, which are innately contrary to the fundamental principle of a social 
state […] [putting] the Greek government and parliament under direct political 
                                                     
40 Greece: Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (Memorandum of Understanding on 
Specific Economic Policy Conditionality), (2010) supra n. 14, 47 et seq. 
41 Greece: Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (Memorandum of Understanding on 
Specific Economic Policy Conditionality), (2012) supra n. 14, 51 et seq. 
42 Greece: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (2010), supra n. 14. 
43 ‘In line with the conclusions of the euro-area summit of 26 October 2011, the Government will fully 
cooperate with the Commission, the ECB and the IMF staff teams to strengthen the monitoring of 
programme implementation, and will provide the staff teams with access to all relevant data and other 
information in the Greek administration. However the ownership of the programme and all executive 
responsibilities in the programme implementation remain with the Greek Government.’ Greece: Letter of 
Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (2012), supra n. 14. 
44 Factsheet, IMF Conditionality, supra n. 38. 
45 ECtHR, Koufaki and Adedy v Greece, Appl. Nos. 57665/12 57657/12, Admissibility Decision of 7 May 
2013, para. 47. 
46 Stuckler and Basu, supra n. 17, 82-83, as compared to Iceland, ibid., 57-75. When the Greek Prime 
Minister Papandreou announced a referendum in November 2011 on a second round of austerity 
measures from the Troika and despite the fact that ‘it was plainly apparent to the Greek public that the 
austerity programme was not working’ with budget cuts as well as rising government debt, ‘under 
pressure from the troika and other European political leaders to pay back German and other investors 
quickly, Papandreou was forced to call the referendum off.’ ibid., 88 and further 92. 
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control of their debtors […]’.47 That the Troika was confronted with the legacy of 
rampant mismanagement and corruption in the public financial system may have 
rendered its job more complex, but hardly justifies the degree of economic and 
social control it exercised in constant violation of the Rechtstaat. 
In a recent review of its general guidelines on conditionality as well as the 
design and effects of IMF-supported programmes during the period 2002-2011, 
the IMF’s own findings highlight that ‘further strengthening implementation of 
underlying policies might be required’, as challenges remained in ‘considering 
macro-social issues in IMF-supported programs [and] enhancing program 
ownership and transparency’.48 While the IMF review concludes that ‘Fund-
supported programs are increasingly emphasizing social aspects’ and ‘[s]ocial 
spending has been largely safeguarded under most Fund-supported programs’, it 
notes some exceptions, including that of Greece, stating: ‘in certain programs, 
successful crisis resolution has required significant cuts in expenditures, including 
in social sectors, and in real wages (the Greece program is a leading example)’.49 
Greece claimed to have relinquished its sovereignty to the alleged authority of 
the external actors and in doing so sought to relieve itself of responsibility for the 
austerity policies linked to the conditionality that accompanied financial support. 
This is familiar terrain if we reflect on the impacts that the World Bank and IMF 
as international financial institutions have had on developing country governance 
over the past decades. This problem has been widely identified in the development 
literature and was summed up in a 2005 UK Policy Paper review on conditionality, 
which highlighted the negative impact both bilateral and multilateral donors have 
had on democratic governance in recipient countries as a result of developing 
countries being answerable to their donors rather than to their constituents.50 One 
corollary is that national policy-makers can escape (or seek to escape) 
responsibility for their actions by attributing unpopular policies that were shaped 
on the basis of lender conditions to the international financial institutions or other 
agencies. Indeed, the International Labour Organization reports that Greece 
explained to a 2011 High Level ILO mission that despite the fact that 20 per cent 
of the population was facing the risk of poverty, ‘it did not have the opportunity in 
meeting with the Troika, to discuss the impact of social security reforms on the 
spread of poverty, particularly for persons of small means and the social security 
benefits to withstand any such trends. It also did not have the opportunity to discuss 
the impact that policies in the areas of taxation, wages and employment would 
have on the sustainability of the social security system’.51 Moreover, in an alarming 
sign of the governments’ impotence vis-à-vis the Troika, the ILO mission reports 
that: ‘The Government was encouraged by the fact that these issues were on the 
                                                     
47 Katrougalos, supra n. 30. 
48 IMF, Survey Magazine: Policy, 17 Sept. 2012, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/POL091712A.htm. 
49 IMF, Review of Conditionality, 19 June 2012, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/061912a.pdf. 
50 Partnerships for Poverty Reduction: Rethinking Conditionality, UK Policy Paper (Mar. 2005). 
51 IKA-ETAM v Greece, supra n. 33, para. 36. Emphasis added. 
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agenda of an international organisation [the ILO] and hoped that the ILO would 
be in a position to convey these issues to the Troika’.52   
While the Greek government has itself been deemed to have failed to 
undertake even a minimum assessment of the impact of measures on vulnerable 
groups,53 the IMF – by its own admission – does not consistently conduct prior 
social impact assessment. Between 2006 and 2010, nine of the 18 countries in an 
IMF case study sample were subject to programme conditionality affecting the 
prices of products consumed by the poor.54 IMF economists have also been 
accused of assuming – without the hard data to back up their assumptions – that 
government spending would shrink economies and that all forms of government 
spending were the same. A recalculation of IMF estimates by Stuckler and Basu 
from real data (not mathematical models) and disaggregated by different types of 
government programmes over a period of ten years and across 27 industrialised 
countries, found that the IMF both underestimated austerity’s economic harms 
and overlooked the damage that resulted from cutting public health budgets. 
According to Stuckler and Basu’s peer-reviewed findings, it is health and education 
that offer the ‘greatest fiscal multipliers’55 (where every $1 invested in these 
programmes returns $3 back in economic growth and thus increased fiscal revenue 
to the State56). To this it might be added that human rights also benefit directly 
from social investment. The findings above point to a disregard by external actors 
of the requirement to undertake ex ante and ex post social impact assessment that 
forms a basic expectation of human rights law including guarantees of 
consultation by persons likely to be affected by the policies and access to 
information and transparency regarding public access to the results of 
assessments.57  
There is a long and sordid history of the negative impacts on socio-economic 
rights as well as political rights based on the interventions of international financial 
                                                     
52 ibid., para. 36; Report on the High Level Mission to Greece (Athens, 19-23 Sept. 2011), International Labour 
Office, para. 88.  
53 ‘[T]he Committee […] considers that the Government has not conducted the minimum level of 
research and analysis into the effects of such far-reaching measures that is necessary to assess in a 
meaningful manner their full impact on vulnerable groups in society.’ Pensioners' Union of the Agricultural 
Bank of Greece (ATE) v Greece, European Committee of Social Rights, Complaint, Complaint No. 80/2012 
16 Jan. 2012, para. 75. 
54 IMF, Review of Conditionality, supra n. 49, para. 26. 
55 Stuckler and Basu, supra n. 17, 65 
56 ibid., xii.  
57 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Observations: 
Greece, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GRC/CO/7, paras. 13(c), 33(b), 40; Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial 
Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2011), Principle 14, available at: 
http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/Institutes/MaastrichtCentreForHumanRights/MaastrichtETO
Principles.htm; 
O. De Schutter, A. Eide, A. Khalfan, M. Orellana, M.E. Salomon and I. Seiderman, ‘Commentary to the 
Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ 34 Human Rights Quarterly (2012) 1084, at 1115-1119. 
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institutions in developing countries58 whereby human rights-holders were left to 
direct claims to their enfeebled governments as the traditional state duty-bearers 
under the relevant human rights treaties, while the international financial 
institutions, wearing their ‘non-state’ actor hats have been able to claim that they 
possess no legal obligations in the area of human rights.59 It is not surprising to 
hear comparisons between the infamous period of structural adjustment in Africa 
as elsewhere a few decades ago and austerity-driven conditionality in Europe 
today. A former World Bank vice president is explicit in his recent comparison 
remarking that ‘[l]essons have not been learned’ and ‘SAPS’ being imposed on 
Europe now by the IMF are very similar to those that were being pushed on 
developing countries in the 70s and 80s by the World Bank and IMF’.60  What we 
see in the case of Greece (as elsewhere61) is a comparable accountability gap when 
it comes to the IMF as Troika member.  
 
 
 
IV CONDITIONALITY, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, 
JURISDICTION AND EU LAW 
 
In so far as the IMF has remained beyond the reach of international human rights 
law, a point to which we will return below in Part V, one might assume a better 
outcome when it comes to addressing the fundamental rights obligations of the 
EC and ECB as EU institutions, bound as they are under the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights to ‘respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the 
application [of the Charter] in accordance with their respective powers’,62 but this 
has not been the case. The Charter provides for rights concerning collective 
                                                     
58 See the findings of Abouharb and Cingranelli: ‘Based on an analysis of outcomes in 131 developing 
countries between 1981-2003, we show that, on average, structural adjustment has led to less respect for 
economic and social rights, and worker rights.’ M.R. Abouharb and D. Cingranelli, Human Rights and 
Structural Adjustment (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 4 et seq. 
59 See further, M.E. Salomon, ‘International Economic Governance and Human Rights Accountability’ in 
M.E. Salomon, A. Tostensen and W. Vandenhole (eds), Casting the Net Wider: Human Rights, Development 
and New Duty-Bearers (Intersentia, 2007) 153; F. Gianviti, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the 
International Monetary Fund’ in P. Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press, 2005) 113. 
60 I. Goldin, Divided Nations: Why Global Governance is Failing and What We Can Do About It, LSE Public 
Lecture (20 Mar. 2013), available at:    
http://www.lse.ac.uk/publicEvents/events/2013/03/20130320t1830vHKT.aspx. Harvey remarks: ‘in 
1984 the World Bank, for the first time in its history, granted a loan to a country in return for structural 
neoliberal reforms. De la Madrid then opened Mexico to the global economy by joining GATT and 
implementing an austerity programme. The effects were wrenching […]’. D. Harvey, A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press, 2005) 100. 
61 K. Chrysostomides, ‘Cyprus bailout: the test of illegality’, Cyprus Mail (Online), 7 Sept. 2013. 
62 Art. 51(1), Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000: ‘The provisions of this 
Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for 
the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They 
shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in 
accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as 
conferred on it in the Treaties.’ 
                           2/2015 
 
 14 
bargaining, fair and just working conditions, the entitlement to social security and 
social assistance, and access to health care, as well as the protection of human 
dignity and the right to life; all rights impacted by the austerity measures in 
Greece.63 The Charter also provides for equality between men and woman in all 
areas, including employment, work and pay but, as Ewing highlights; ‘far from 
ensuring the pain [of the Troika’s bailout terms] is endured equally between men 
and women, crucially the burden is falling disproportionately on the latter. This is 
true especially in terms of the impact of the growing levels of unemployment, and 
the move to part-time and rotation contracts, with women suffering additional 
problems of discrimination in trying to enforce maternity rights’.64 Procedural 
fairness is also protected by  the Charter’s ‘right to good administration’, inviting 
social impact assessment aimed at limiting negative repercussions on the most 
vulnerable segments of society, in reconciling competing interests,65 and in 
upholding the requirements on EU institutions of broad consultation and 
transparency with concerned parties.66  
As is familiar by now, the European Court of Justice in its first judgment 
addressing the legal consequences of the sovereign debt crisis and sitting as Full 
Court, ruled in the Pringle case on whether the ESM – an international organisation 
constituted by the then 17 euro currency EU Member States under a non-EU 
intergovernmental treaty – was legally constituted. The ESM is a permanent crisis 
resolution mechanism for the countries of the eurozone with a mandate to issue 
debt instruments in order to finance loans and other forms of financial assistance 
to eurozone Members States.67 It is a mechanism through which eurozone 
Member States can pool their resources to assist individual Member States 
experiencing financial difficulty. The basis for establishing the ESM as a separate 
international organisation rather than an EU agency is in part due to the 
unwillingness of the non-euro Member States of the EU to contribute financially 
and to bear the risks of assisting eurozone countries,68 but also notably due to the 
                                                     
63 For a helpful and systematic list of Charter rights subject to MoU conditionality see the recently 
released report by A. Fischer-Lescano, Human Rights in Times of Austerity Policy: The EU Institutions and the 
Conclusion of Memoranda of Understanding, Legal Opinion commissioned by the Chamber of Labour, Vienna 
(2014), available at: http://www.etuc.org/sites/www.etuc.org/files/press-
release/files/legal_opinion_human_rights_in_times_of_austerity_policy_final.pdf. 
64 K. Ewing, Troika Imposes Illegal Terms on Greece, The Institute of Employment Rights (12 May 2012), 
available at: http://www.ier.org.uk/news/troika-imposing-illegal-terms-greece; ‘The Committee notes 
with concern that the current financial and economic crisis and measures taken by the State party to 
address it within the framework of the policies designed in cooperation with the European Union 
institutions and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are having detrimental effects on women in all 
spheres of life. CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Greece, supra. n. 57, para. 6. 
65 On the requirements and benefits of the procedural approach including in properly balancing 
competing interests: D. O’Donovan The Insulation of Austerity: The Charter of Fundamental Rights and European 
Union Institutions (2013), available at: http://humanrights.ie/uncategorized/the-insulation-of-austerity-the-
charter-of-fundamental-rights-and-european-union-institutions/; and see C. Barnard, The Charter, the Court 
and the Crisis, University of Cambridge Legal Studies Research Series, Paper No. 18/2013.  
66 Arts. 11(2) and (3) TFEU, see further: O’Donovan, supra n. 65. 
67 European Stability Mechanism, available at: http://www.esm.europa.eu/index.htm.  
68  See, de Witte and Beukers, supra n. 10, 813. 
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‘no bailout clause’ at Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) that prohibits the Union or its Member States from becoming 
liable or assuming commitments of other Member States. In Pringle the ECJ held 
that the establishment of the ESM was legal on procedural and substantive 
grounds.69 
The ESM is not a Union body and the Member States party to it are not 
implementing Union law, as such the Charter would seem to bind neither of them. 
In the Pringle case the national court observed, referring to an argument put 
forward by the applicant, that the establishment of the ESM outside of the EU 
legal order may have the consequence that the ESM is removed from the scope of 
the Charter rendering the establishment of the ESM in breach of Article 47 of the 
Charter which guarantees to all the right to an effective remedy.70 The issue raised 
was that the conditions the ESM attach to stability support could have an adverse 
effect on the social rights in the Charter. The ECJ rejected the claim, concluding 
that the Union had no competence itself to establish such a mechanism within the 
EU and that the (resulting) ESM is removed from the scope of the Charter as are 
the Member States on the basis of Charter Articles 51(1) (Member States are not 
implementing Union law) and 51(2) (the Charter does not extend the field of 
application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new 
powers or tasks for the Union or modify powers and tasks as defined in the 
Treaties).71  
One unresolved issue of key importance is the possibility that EU institutions 
could do outside of the EU that which they could not do within the EU – 
disregard the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the exercise of their tasks. The 
Court, for its part, left open whether the EU institutions – the European 
Commission and the ECB – can be bound by the Charter in relation to their 
conduct under the ESM.72 Advocate-General Kokott’s position, correct on a 
teleological reading of Article 51(1), was that an EU institution was bound by the 
full extent of EU law including the Charter, also when acting outside of the EU.73 
Peers reaches the same conclusion but on a textual reading, making the astute 
observation that the Article 51(1) requirement to abide by the Charter ‘only when 
implementing Union law’, is best understood as directed solely to Member States and 
                                                     
69 Article 136 TFEU was amended to authorise euro Member States to establish a permanent stability 
mechanism. The ESM entered into force prior to the entry into force of the European Council Decision 
providing the authorisation and this has been the basis of a number of legal challenges, including in the 
Pringle case. Second was the compatibility of the ESM with a number of substantive provisions of the 
treaty most notably the prohibition on bailouts in Article 125 TFEU. 
70 Case C-370/12 Pringle v Ireland, Judgment (Full Court) of 27 Nov. 2012, para. 178 and further 
elaborated at para. 192 (AG Kokott). 
71 ibid., paras. 178-181. Cf., ibid, paras. 193-194 (AG Kokott). 
72 See, P. Craig, ‘Pringle and Use of EU Institutions outside of the EU Legal Framework: Foundations, 
Procedures and Substance’ 9 European Constitutional Law Review 2 (2013) 263, at 281-282. 
73 Pringle v Ireland, supra n. 70, para. 176 (AG Kokott); ‘[…] The Commission remains, even when it acts 
within the framework of the ESM, an institution of the Union and as such is bound by the full extent of 
European Union law, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights.’ Craig remarks that Kokott’s position 
is ‘normatively desirable and  legally sustainable’ on the wording of article 51(1), albeit strained on the 
basis of the second sentence of 51(1). Craig, ibid., 282. 
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not to the EU institutions and bodies of the Union.74 As such Article 51(1) 
provides in fact that the EU institutions and bodies are bound by the Charter 
whether they are implementing EU law or not. Article 51 states that the EU 
institutions are bound by the Charter without delineating any specific context; 
there is no basis upon which to conclude that fundamental rights obligations can 
be circumvented on the pretext of a delegation of functions.75 Consistent with this 
view that now enjoys widespread support among legal commentators, the 
Committee on Constitutional Affairs of the European Parliament concludes that 
‘the EU institutions are fully bound by Union law and that within the Troika they 
are obliged to act in accordance with fundamental rights, which, under Article 51 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, apply at all times.76 
That the Member States ‘borrowed’ the EU institutions for use by the ESM, and 
that, according to the Court, the extra tasks should ‘not alter the essential character 
of the powers conferred on those institutions by the EU and FEU Treaties’,77 only 
reinforces the argument that EU institutions should not be able to carry out duties 
consistent with their usual duties when acting within the EU, as required, but 
without the usual checks and balances when it comes to obligations under the 
Charter.78 As we shall soon see, there is a further complication that cannot be 
skirted over: while the Commission and ECB negotiate economic policy 
conditionality with recipient countries – which as argued above would require they 
do so in a manner compliant with their duties under the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights –  they do so on behalf of the ESM.79 
 
 
 
V  CONDITIONALITY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
As is clear, where the ESM provides stability support, conditionality is a 
requirement: ‘Such conditionality may range from a macro-economic adjustment 
programme to continuous respect of pre-established eligibility conditions.’80 In the 
Pringle case, the ECJ recalls that in order to comply with EU law any financial 
                                                     
74 S. Peers, ‘Towards a New Form of EU Law?: The Use of EU Institutions outside the EU Legal 
Framework’ 9 European Constitutional Law Review. 1 (2013) 37, at 51-52. 
75 Fischer-Lescano, supra n. 63, 9. 
76 Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Opinion, 11 Feb. 2014, 2013/2277(INI) para. 11. 
77 Pringle v Ireland, supra n. 70, para. 158. 
78 See generally, J. Tomkin, ‘Contradiction, Circumvention and Conceptual Gymnastics: The Impact of 
the Adoption of the ESM Treaty on the State of European Democracy’, 14 German Law Journal 1 (2013) 
169, at 174.  
79 Peers speculates as to whether the ECJ left open the question of whether the EU institutions can be 
bound by the Charter in relation to their conduct under the ESM because the Court had taken the view 
that those institutions could not adopt binding acts pursuant to the ESM Treaty. Peers, supra n. 74, 52. 
80 ESM Treaty, supra n. 12, Art. 12(1). 
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assistance provided under a stability mechanism created by Member States ‘will be 
made subject to strict conditionality’.81  
Through these eyes conditionality offers only benefits; its aim is to secure 
investments directed at stabilising the economy. From the point of view of the 
recipient state, or more specifically the people impacted by the conditionality, the 
measures can have egregious impacts on the exercise of socio-economic rights. As 
reported by the UN Special Rapporteur on foreign debt and human rights 
following a mission to Greece in 2013, information which is now common 
knowledge, socio-economic rights are under threat or being undermined by 
austerity measures that the Greek Government has been required to implement 
since May 2010 in return for the bailouts. Rights that preoccupy the Special 
Rapporteur include: the rights to work and the ‘unprecedented rise in 
unemployment’ between 2008-2013; the right to social security whereby he argues 
that the priority has been ‘fiscal consolidation at the expense of the welfare of the 
people in Greece’; and the right to housing, highlighting that there has been an 
estimated 25 per cent increase in the country’s homeless population since 2009. 
When it comes to the right to health and healthcare, the Special Rapporteur 
remarks on the drop in expenditure and inaccessibility by the poor due to the 
introduction of fees,82 with other findings pointing to a 200 per cent rise in the 
incidence of HIV/AIDS in Greece,83 the return of mother-to-child transmission 
of HIV (routine screens are no longer conducted on pregnant women),84 and the 
return of malaria.85 The Special Rapporteur also notes his concern as to the 
exacerbation of poverty and inequality, along with the negative impact of 
privatisation on access to essential services.86 What we have seen so far, and in 
significant ways what the Social Rights Committee cases against Greece highlights, 
is a disregard for the human rights implications of structural adjustment policies 
and a series of unresolved issues on the attribution of international legal 
responsibility for the harms incurred.  
The governance structure of the ESM is comparable to that of the IMF with 
a Board of Governors and a Board of Directors having full decision-making 
powers.87 The voting rights of each ESM Member is exercised by its appointee or 
by the latter's representative on the Board of Governors or Board of Directors.88 
Each ESM Member appoints a Governor who is member of the government of 
                                                     
81 Pringle v Ireland, supra n. 70, para. 72. 
82 United Nations Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international 
financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and 
cultural rights, Mission to Greece, 22-26 April 2013, End of Mission Statement , available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13272&LangID=E 
83 Stuckler and Basu, supra. n. 17, xiv. 
84 ibid., 91. 
85 ibid., xiv. 
86 UN Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt, End of Mission Statement, supra. n. 82 . 
87 ESM Treaty, supra n. 12, Arts. 4-6, and elsewhere. 
88 ibid., Art. 4(7): ‘The voting rights of each ESM Member, as exercised by its appointee or by the latter's 
representative on the Board of Governors or Board of Directors, shall be equal to the number of shares 
allocated to it in the authorised capital stock of the ESM as set out in Annex II.’ 
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that ESM Member with responsibility for finance.89 The ESM treaty anticipates 
various delegated tasks to the European Commission and the ECB. This includes 
a mandate from the Board of Governors to the EC to negotiate, in liaison with the 
ECB, the economic policy conditionality attached to each financial assistance in 
accordance with Article 13(3)90 which has the Board of Governors entrusting the 
EC – again in liaison with the ECB and, wherever possible, together with the IMF 
– with the task of negotiating with the ESM Member concerned a memorandum 
of understanding detailing the conditionality attached to the financial assistance 
facility, as well as monitoring compliance with the conditionality attached to the 
financial assistance.91 Notably, the ESM is to cooperate very closely with the IMF 
in providing stability support and furthermore a eurozone Member State 
requesting financial assistance from the ESM is expected to address, wherever 
possible, a similar request to the IMF.92 The EC signs the Memoranda on behalf 
of the ESM, subject ultimately to approval by the Board of Governors.93 In the 
Pringle case, the Court notes that ‘the duties conferred on the Commission and 
ECB within the ESM Treaty, important as they are, do not entail any power to 
make decisions of their own. Further, the activities pursued by those two 
institutions within the ESM Treaty solely commit the ESM.’94  
So the ESM treaty confers decision-making power on the Board of 
Governors or Board of Directors and it should be uncontroversial that as 
representatives of their state on the Board of Governors or Board of Directors 
each is bound to comply with their international human rights obligations in the 
policies they pursue that impact on the exercise of those rights in recipient 
countries, the approval vote cast by their representative constituting a state act and 
thus subject to human rights law and the general law on state responsibility. The 
international legal personality of the ESM95 does not imply that decisions adopted 
by the organs of the international organisation can be attributed to the 
organisation but not to the states that participated in the organs: This argument 
fails to distinguish between the act of the state and the act of the international 
organisation. As the Centre for International Environmental Law has pointed out 
in a comparable context, the question is not one of attribution of the international 
organisation’s act to the state, but rather of the responsibility of the state for its 
own act. Further, the argument that there can be no state responsibility where 
there is international personality creates a ‘legal limbo’, one where states control 
the international organisation but are immune from legal responsibility for the 
consequences of such control. It appears that the better approach is to recognise 
                                                     
89 ibid., Art. 5(1). 
90 ibid., Art. 5(6)(g).  
91 ibid., Art. 13(7).  
92 ibid., preambular para. 8.  
93 ibid., Art.13( 4).  
94 Pringle v Ireland, supra n. 70, para. 161. 
95 ESM Treaty, supra n. 12, Art. 32.  
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the possibility of both the responsibility of the state for the acts of its organ, such 
as an executive director that votes to approve a project, as well as the 
responsibility of the organisation for the acts of its organs, for example, a board of 
directors that approves a project.96 As the Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organizations point out:  
 
A State member of an international organization incurs international 
responsibility if, by taking advantage of the fact that the organization has 
competence in relation to the subject-matter of one of the State’s 
international obligations, it circumvents that obligation by causing the 
organization to commit an act that, if committed by the State, would have 
constituted a breach of the obligation.97  
 
Moreover, while it could be argued that a state would not incur international 
responsibility when aiding and abetting an international organisation of which it is 
a member when it acts in accordance with the rules of the organisation, this does not 
imply that the state is free to ignore its other international obligations, for example 
in the area of human rights, and it would incur responsibility for a breach of those 
obligations as part of the law on state responsibility.98 There are also strong 
arguments to suggest that Member States of international organisations are 
precluded from making decisions within the international organisation that are 
contrary to the human rights obligations to which the Member States have all 
subscribed or to which the shareholders with majority voting rights have 
subscribed where a system of weighted voting is used, as in the ESM and IMF.99 
Finally, it might also be noted that like all eurozone states, Greece is a member of 
the ESM and the IMF and is equally required to ensure compliance with its 
international human rights obligations when acting under the auspices of those 
organisations. 
While it is clear that the Memoranda require economic conditionality and, as 
highlighted earlier, that their terms outline economic policies in some detail 
including many that are likely to impact on the exercise of socio-economic rights, 
and further that some degree of domestic discretion may be engaged in the 
implementation of economic policy,100 a form of joint responsibility among the 
                                                     
96 International Financial Institutions and Human Rights Law, Legal Analysis by the Centre for International 
Environmental Law, Public Hearing, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (127th Regular 
Period of Sessions) (1 Mar. 2007) 4; see also Salomon, supra n. 59, 153. 
97 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, 2011 
(A/66/10) [hereinafter ARIO], Art. 61.  
98 See, International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations with 
Commentaries 2011 (A/66/10) Art. 58(2) at 91, para. 5. See similarly, ARIO, Art. 59(2). 
99 R. Hennessy, ‘Defining States’ International Legal Obligations to Cooperate for the Achievement of 
Human Development: One Aspect of Operationalising a Human Rights-Based Approach to 
Development’ in M. Scheinin and M. Suksi (eds) Human Rights in Development, Yearbook 2002 (Brill, 2002) 
71. 
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various multi-level legal persons might be warranted.101 On this model, joint 
responsibility could be attributed to the ESM Member States and to the ESM in so 
far as the ESM can be said to have general human rights obligations to respect the 
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person,102 and on the 
basis of the common human rights obligations of its Member States  all of which 
have ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
and to the Greek government for any influence it might be expected to have 
exercised over the domestic implementation of the policies. On the same 
reasoning, the IMF could also be liable – contrary to arguments that suggest it 
should escape legal responsibility – in so far as it remains subject to some debate 
as to whether it possesses human rights obligations.103 Like the ESM, the IMF 
could be said to have obligations to respect the basic rights of the human person 
and, moreover, the human rights obligations common to its Member States. Both 
international organisations would also be required to refrain from steps that would 
undermine the possibility of the recipient state complying with its national and 
international human rights obligations.104 Separate from any responsibility of the 
IMF qua the IMF, as above the IMF Member States are required to comply with 
their existing human rights obligations including when acting under the auspices of 
an international organisation. Finally, while the Commission and ECB would 
remain bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights if we concur with the 
seemingly unanimous views of legal commentators on the Pringle case, one 
commentator further suggests that the EU itself should be held jointly liable, ‘since 
EU institutions were involved in the negotiation of the MoUs with the 
Commission and the ECB in accordance with Article 13 of the ESM Treaty, 
through a specific form of delegation of functions in which responsibility was not 
fully transferred’.105 
                                                                                                                                       
public sector wages and pensions.’ European Economy, The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, supra. n. 
7, 9. 
101 As O’Donovan points out: ‘Isolating the international element can be difficult in the case work.’ 
O’Donovan, supra n. 65. 
102 See, M.W. Mutua and R. Howse, ‘Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy: Challenges for the 
World Trade Organization’ Rights & Democracy (2000); M.E. Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights: 
World Poverty and the Development of International, (Oxford University Press, 2007) 160-179. 
103 See, Gianviti, supra n. 59; and cf. Salomon, supra n. 59; and P. Sands and P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of 
International Institutions (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 2001) 459: ‘It has been suggested that, for example, 
the World Bank is not subject to general international norms for the protection of fundamental human 
rights. In our view that conclusion is without merit, on legal or policy grounds.’  
104 On the matter of accountability Wouters and Odermatt point out that ‘ARIO [Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations] do not address the real obstacles preventing individuals 
from bringing IOs to account, such as the lack of available judicial forums or procedural obstacles such 
as the immunity of IOs before domestic courts’. J. Wouters and J. Odermatt, ‘Are All International 
Organizations Created Equal?’ 9 International Organizations Law Review 1 (2012) 8, at 10, and see; A. 
Reinisch and J. Wurm, ‘International Financial Institutions before National Courts’ in D.D. Bradlow and 
D. Hunter (eds), International Financial Institutions and International Law (Kluwer, 2010) 103 and S. Herz, 
‘Rethinking International Financial Institution Immunity’, ibid., 137. 
105 Fischer-Lescano, supra n. 63, 7 and 15-16. Cf., On developments as well as limits to social rights as 
‘general principles’ of EU law see, I. de Jesús Butler, The European Union and International Human Rights Law 
(OHCHR Regional Office for Europe, 2011). 
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On the matter of protecting human rights and guaranteeing the right to a 
remedy when states transfer competences to international organisations, the 
European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly held that while obligations under 
the European Convention on Human Rights do not preclude states cooperating in 
certain fields of activity, that the obligations of Contracting states continue even 
after the transfer of competences.106 Moreover, state action taken in compliance 
with such legal obligations is only justified as long as the relevant organisation is 
considered to protect the fundamental rights that bind the states in question (in 
this case under the European Convention on Human Rights), as regards both the 
substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance, 
in a manner which can be considered ‘at least equivalent’ to that for which the 
Convention provides.107  
There is an additional point to highlight here on the nature of obligations of 
States party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, all of which are also ESM Member States. Under that human rights treaty, 
there is a requirement that the obligations to respect the rights provided for in the 
Covenant are complied with, including when acting internationally.108 States have 
an obligation to refrain from conduct which nullifies or impairs the exercise of 
socio-economic rights of persons outside of their territories, also when acting 
collectively.109 As mentioned  above, they are also required to refrain from any 
conduct that indirectly impairs the ability of another state to comply with its 
obligations in the area of socio-economic rights, or to aid, assist, direct or control 
another state in that regard.110 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) mandated to monitor compliance with the Covenant, has 
repeatedly taken the position that States parties to the Covenant as members of 
international financial institutions should pay greater attention to the protection of 
Covenant rights, including as regards the rights to work and social security ‘in 
influencing the lending policies, credit agreements, structural adjustment 
programmes and international measures of these institutions. The strategies, 
programmes and policies adopted by States parties under structural adjustment 
programmes should not interfere with their core obligations […]’ and impact 
                                                     
106 ECtHR, Mathews v United Kingdom, Appl. No. 24833/94, Grand Chamber Judgment of 18 Feb. 1999, 
paras. 29, 32 and 34; ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy v Germany, Appl. No. 26083/94, Grand Chamber 
Judgment of 18 Feb. 1999, para. 67; ECtHR, Bosphorus Hava Yollary Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v 
Ireland, Appl. No. 45036/98, Grand Chamber Judgment of 30 June 2005, paras. 152–156. See also, The 
Maastricht Principles, supra n. 57, Principle 15. 
107 Bosphorus Airways v Ireland, ibid., para. 155; ECtHR, Gasparini v l'Italie et la Belgique, Requête No. 
10750/03, Deuxieme Section, Decision de 12 mai 2009. While this article focuses on the ESM and its 
Member States it raises comparable issues related to the role of eurozone Member States and the lending 
decisions of the EFSF in the period prior to 2013.  
108 ICESCR, Art. 2(1): ‘1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the 
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures.’ See, Maastricht Principles, supra n. 57, Principles 8-9. 
109 ibid., Principles 19-20.  
110 ibid., Principle 21;  O. De Schutter, et al., supra n. 57, 1128-1131. 
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negatively on Covenant rights.111 The jurisprudential work of the CESCR points 
clearly towards an appreciation of the very considerable influence on the exercise 
of socio-economic rights generated by external actors, including the decisions with 
extraterritorial effect taken under the auspices of the influential states and the 
institutions they direct. The position of the Committee underscores the 
expectation that human rights will be integral to decision-making where those 
decisions may impact on them, and moreover, that they give rise to corresponding 
obligations to act collectively towards meeting Covenant obligations.112 The parties 
to the ESM treaty may have side-stepped their obligations under the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, but not under ICESCR,113 for which they may incur 
responsibility. 
 
 
 
VI  WHAT SHOULD BE EXPECTED OF EXTERNAL ACTORS? 
 
In the decisions against Greece by the Social Rights Committee, the Committee 
outlines what is required of the state to ensure individual rights are not infringed, 
in this case as regards cuts to pension entitlements and the right to social security. 
For our purposes, it seems wholly reasonable to suppose that the institutions 
constituting the Troika, and any other external actor influencing the terms of 
conditionality in recipient countries and thus human rights, should also be 
expected to take on board a range of precautionary steps to avoid human rights 
harms in the exercise of their tasks. If we were to draw on the Social Rights 
Committee views and apply them to international institutions, the decisions of 
international institutions would need better to reconcile measures in the ‘general 
interest’ with human rights, including ‘the legitimate expectations that individuals 
may have in respect of the stability of rules’ as the cases against Greece 
highlight.114 This is a variation on the international human rights law principle of 
                                                     
111 CESCR, General Comment No. 18, The Right to Work (art 6), (35th session, 2005) UN Doc. 
E/C12/GC/18 (2005), para. 30; CESCR, General Comment No. 19, The Right to Social Security (Art. 
9), (39th session, 2008) UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/19, para. 58 ‘States parties should ensure that their actions 
as members of international organizations take due account of the right to social security. Accordingly, 
States parties that are members of international financial institutions, notably the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, and regional development banks, should take steps to ensure that the right to 
social security is taken into account in their lending policies, credit agreements and other international 
measures. States parties should ensure that the policies and practices of international and regional 
financial  institutions, in particular those concerning their role in structural adjustment and in the design 
and implementation of social security systems, promote and do not interfere with the right to social 
security.’ 
112 See, Salomon, supra n. 102, 59-60. 
113 For an argument that eurozone states that have also accepted the jurisdiction of the Social Rights 
Committee to receive collective complaints could be the target of complaints regarding their shared 
responsibility for the violation of social rights in Greece, see, M. Sant’Ana, ‘Enforcing Extraterritorial 
Social Rights in the Eurozone Crisis’, in M. Gibney and W. Vandenhole (eds), Litigating Transnational 
Human Rights Obligations: Alternative Judgements (Routledge, 2014) 302. 
114 IKA-ETAM v Greece, supra n. 33, para. 82. 
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non-retrogression and an analogy can be made with the work of CESCR in that 
there is a strong presumption that retrogressive measures on the part of a state are 
not permitted.115International institutions should seek to respect those 
presumptions. Potentially retrogressive measures could include cuts to 
expenditures on public services that are essential for the realisation of socio-
economic rights, or cuts to taxes that are critical to funding those services.116 
Should a state use resource constraints as a justification for any steps that lead to a 
retrogression in rights, CESCR has indicated that in order not to fall foul of the 
Covenant a number of factors would need to be considered, such as the severity 
of the alleged breach, including whether the situation concerned the enjoyment of 
the minimum essential level of a right; and whether the state party had sought to 
identify low-cost options.117 If any deliberately retrogressive measures are taken, 
CESCR has determined that the state party has the burden of proving that they 
have been introduced after the most careful consideration of all alternatives,118 and 
that economic policy choices should always be those that least restrict rights.119 To 
be clear, the principle of non-retrogression properly applied should not unduly 
circumscribe the flexibility of a state to respond to economic crises, but what it 
does do is signal the primacy of human rights, force a government to justify rights 
reductions, and foreground the requirement that no one fall below a certain 
standard.  
Other requirements that the Social Rights Committee concluded the 
Government of Greece would have had to have met in order not to have been in 
violation of the right to social security under the Social Rights Charter, which 
should surely form part of the package required of international financial 
institutions, are that ‘restrictive measures’ must not deprive ‘one segment of the 
population of a very substantial portion of their means of subsistence’.120 
'Adjustments' (in this case to social security entitlements of pensioners) should be 
implemented in a manner that ‘takes due account of their vulnerability, settled 
financial expectations and ultimately their right to enjoy access to social protection 
and social security’.121 Greece, the Social Rights Committee concluded, 
 
had not established, as is required by Article 12(3) of the European Social 
Charter, that efforts have been made to maintain a sufficient level of 
protection for the benefit of the most vulnerable members of society, even 
                                                     
115 CESCR, General Comment No. 19, The Right to Social Security, supra n. 111, para. 42, as elsewhere. 
116 See, R. Balakrishnan and D. Elson, ‘Auditing Economic Policy in the Light of Obligations on 
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though the effects of the adopted measures risk bringing about a large scale 
pauperisation of a significant segment of the population […].122  
 
To be sure, the Troika institutions and their masters have not made every effort 
either.  
In sum, international organisations that impact on the exercise of human 
rights by virtue of that power should by now have their relevant human rights 
duties clearly spelled out. The ‘political prohibition’ in the IMF’s Articles of 
Agreement whereby ‘only economic considerations shall be relevant to their 
decisions’ does not on any contemporary account entail a prohibition of  human 
rights considerations. At a minimum, and as highlighted analogously by the former 
World Bank General Counsel: there are a host of factors including social, 
environmental and political elements that may affect economic growth and thus 
require proper consideration in the crafting of policies.123 While we wait for 
international law to catch up with the exercise of power traditionally assumed to 
be largely that of national authorities, far more should be required of the ‘rescuers’ 
than an attempt to ensure financial stability. 
 
 
 
VII AUSTERITY AND ITS CONTESTANTS 
 
Capitalism's modern variant of the past 40 years has been underpinned by 
deregulation, privatisation, free trade and investment, and the withdrawal of the 
state from many areas of social provision. On this account, human well-being is 
best satisfied by the market and the role of the state is to guarantee the conditions 
that best allow the markets to function, including through the creation of new 
areas for commodification, such as water, education, and healthcare. The embrace 
of neoliberalism in political-economic thinking and practice has been, and remains, 
ubiquitous124 and in significant ways is so entrenched as to be 'beyond ideology'.125 
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123 Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the Work of the World Bank, Senior Vice President and General 
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Austerity offers an economic policy akin to neoliberalism; it is a form of 
‘voluntary deflation in which the economy adjusts through the reduction of wages, 
prices and public spending to restore competitiveness, which is supposedly best 
achieved by cutting the state’s budget, debts, and deficits’.126 According to the 
advocates of austerity this will inspire the confidence of business.127 Many 
commentators have questioned the economic soundness of austerity as a response 
to recession as well as the social implications of austerity. Many have also 
highlighted their deep anxiety over the dominance and hold of austerity orthodoxy 
and the silencing of alternative voices.128 This unease is also significant for our 
purposes, since it points to a categorical disregard of human rights, most notably 
but by no means exclusively socio-economic rights,129 by the international 
institutions that share in the responsibility of having brought austerity so violently 
to bear. This seeming disregard after over half a century of formally entrenching 
socio-economic rights – whether borne of wilful neglect, reveries of institutional 
and disciplinary supremacy, or myopia – invites alarm. 
Austerity has received extensive criticism as a policy response evaluated on its 
own terms – for taking the wrong approach to promoting growth and investment. 
Paul Krugman argued in 2011 that ‘in the face of the current crisis, austerity has 
been a failure everywhere it has been tried’130 and in 2013, that the results of the 
turn to austerity ‘were disastrous – just about as one would have predicted from 
textbook macroeconomics’.131 In an open letter hundreds of US economists 
argued that austerity measures ‘threatened its recovery’ and that it was 
‘dangerous’.132  Using Britain, Ireland, Spain and Greece as examples, they 
highlighted, like Krugman, that ‘inflicting austerity on a weak economy leads to 
deeper recession, rising unemployment and increasing misery’.133 The UK 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research and the ILO are among those 
institutions whose recent findings on Europe indicate the failure of austerity 
measures to address the economic woes across the continent,134 with the work of 
Stuckler and Basu showing the benefits of stimulus to the economy and human 
well-being in both eurozone countries and countries with their own currencies, 
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such as Iceland.135 From the perspective of human rights, austerity measures 
adopted in several European countries point to lacunae in EU law and in the laws 
on international responsibility.  
There are arguments in fact that ‘market fanaticism [was] institutionalized in 
the common currency’136 by removing the capacity of diverse societies to act and 
thereby exposing a particular form of democratic-deficit. No longer with the 
option to decide for themselves whether to devalue their currency and shield 
themselves from globalisation,137 in important ways state sovereignty was qualified 
and with it democracy.138 The various strands reflected in this article come 
together to suggest that Europe is quite acutely misaligned: the euro is a common 
currency but government debt is national; the European system is neither federal 
nor national; and international institutions are empowered to make many decisions 
that impact on well-being but are not systematically responsible for the human 
rights harms that ensue.139 
A 2013 IMF Research Paper challenges austerity in finding that ‘fiscal 
consolidation [austerity] typically raises income inequality, raises long-term 
unemployment and lowers the share of wage income’.140 There is anti-austerity 
agitation in Brussels, with talk of a ‘social progress pact’ and the need to invest in 
education and to provide a social protection floor.141 The EU Justice 
Commissioner called for the Troika to be abolished focusing in particular on 
cutting out the IMF so as to move towards a ‘social market economy’ as the ‘EU 
Treaty requires’.142 While seemingly pointing us in a humane direction, these 
developments leave a sentient observer cold.  
It is untenable, except for the fact that it happened, that the elite failed to see 
the eurozone crisis, and the responses to it, not only as a financial and economic 
issue but also as a human one. They failed effectively to acknowledge that 
stabilising economies through austerity measures at best secures socio-economic 
rights only indirectly and tenuously and, at worst, violates them egregiously. 
Decades of experience from elsewhere in the world on the human costs of 
structural adjustment should inform decision-making, as should the experience of 
the impunity (and immunities) with which international organisations function 
when it comes to the human rights harms caused by their policies. Alongside these 
occurrences, there has been half a century of standard-setting in the area of socio-
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136 W. Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (Verso, 2014) 175. 
137 ‘It serves as a break for capitalist expansion and rationalization […]. Countries able to devalue can 
decide for themselves whether and, at what speed, they wish to discard their pre-capitalist or anti-
capitalist heritage, and in which direction they want to transform it.’  ibid., 182. 
138 See, ibid., 188. 
139 Thanks to Eero Kasanen for valuable exchanges and for some of the ideas captured here. 
140 See, R.H. Wade, ‘Capitalism and Democracy at Cross-Purposes’ 56 Challenge 6 (Nov./Dec. 2013). 
Wade explains, that ‘this is a working paper from the IMF research department, which is quite separate 
from IMF operations (in its operations the IMF continue to push fiscal consolidation in most cases’.) 
141 T. Barber, ‘Anti-Austerity Crusade Sends Mayday Signal across Europe’, Financial Times, 1 May 2013. 
142 ‘EU Commissioner Calls for Troika to be Abolished’, Reuters, 16 July 2013. 
  
Margot E. Salomon                         Of Austerity, Human Rights and International Institutions  
 
 27 
economic rights regionally and internationally enhanced by the normative 
development of their content. Why was all this accumulated knowledge and 
experience ignored? The people of Greece were treated as if there is no history.  
Findings show that securing socio-economic rights is very good for the 
economy and the sharing of its gains.143 Human rights provide an instrumental 
benefit in that they offer a strong foundation for macro-economic performance144 
and represent an intrinsic good in that people, their dignity and their well-being are 
valued. Europe proclaims its commitment to ‘human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights’145 but in the grip of 
institutionalised austerity these values have been very hard to find. The Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union provides that the Union and its Member 
States, in pursuing social policies, shall have in mind ‘fundamental social rights’ 
such as those set out in the European Social Charter of 1961 and the Community 
Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 1989,146 but in 
establishing the support mechanisms and mandating the Troika social rights were 
not kept in mind. The negative impact of austerity on the people of Greece, and 
not only Greece, casts a long shadow over Europe and the idea that its institutions 
– and those institutions with which it is prepared to partner such as the IMF – are 
bound by human rights. Europe's claim to being a progressive force has been 
eroded. 
 
 
 
VIII CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
An important period lies ahead for the development of law and policy in this 
multi-faceted area. Looking ahead, questions of legal doctrine might include 
whether the ‘general or public interest’ should in fact be reducible to the broad 
objectives of the elimination of the budget deficit or the stability of public finances 
as the applicants queried in the recent case of Koufaki and Adedy v Greece before the 
European Court of Human Rights dealing with austerity-induced wage cuts and its 
interference with the applicants right to property;147 all sorts of sins can be masked 
in the search for growth.148 Second, it might be questioned as to whether it is right 
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to conclude as the Court of Human Rights has, that human rights are in fact not 
implicated by reductions in means as long as a person is not reduced to barebones 
existence.149 A third matter is whether the margin of appreciation is a suitable 
doctrine when it is not national authorities determining social policy150 but external 
actors instead. Austerity in Europe should force a rethink across a range of areas. 
As this article has shown, the Social Rights Committee held Greece 
responsible for a violation of the right to social security but Greece (not 
surprisingly) blamed its international creditors for the injurious policies. Borrowing 
states surely retain their human rights obligations despite the role and influence of 
external actors on domestic policy, but the idea that they are in a meaningful 
position to honour those obligations when entering into agreements is deeply 
questionable. The extensive influence of the European Commission, ECB, ESM 
and IMF on the creation of austerity policies in Greece is clear, but when we look 
to the international creditors for awareness as how to devise policies that are 
human rights compliant we find virtually nothing, with the ECJ for its part 
sidestepping pronouncing on the legal responsibility of the Commission and ECB 
for violations of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. As for the IMF, for all intents 
and purposes it continues to benefit from anachronistic legal protections when it 
comes to the human rights impacts of its conditionality and at the level of practice 
has done far too little to see socio-economic rights reflected in its design and 
oversight of national economic policy. Much the same can be said of the ESM.  As 
for the Member States of the ESM and IMF, they retain their human rights 
obligations and this article has considered the current scope of their international 
responsibility in that regard. 
While the economic crisis in Greece may have represented an emergency 
situation that demands the creation of ad hoc urgent mechanisms, this offers no 
justification for disregarding basic rights, democratic oversight, and assurances of 
legal responsibility for all involved; to the contrary, emergency situations should 
                                                                                                                                       
E. Pils, ‘Voice, Reflexivity and Say: Governing Access to and Control of Land in China’ in O. de Schutter 
and K. Pistor (eds), Governing Access to Essential Resources (Columbia University Press, forthcoming).  
149 ‘The Court attaches particular weight to the reasons given by the Supreme Administrative Court [of 
Greece] which, in its judgment of 20 Feb. 2012, dismissed several arguments to the effect that the 
measures in question had breached the proportionality principle. More specifically, the Supreme 
Administrative Court held that the fact that the cuts in wages and pensions were not merely temporary 
was justified, since the legislature’s aim had been not only to remedy the acute budgetary crisis at that 
time but also to consolidate the State’s finances on a lasting basis […]. It further observed that the 
applicants before it had not claimed specifically that their situation had worsened to the extent that they 
risked falling below the subsistence threshold.’  ibid., para. 44 ‘The Court considers that the extent of the 
reduction in the first applicant’s salary was not such as to place her at risk of having insufficient means to 
live on and thus to constitute a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In view of the foregoing and of the 
particular context of the crisis in which the interference in question occurred, the latter could not be said 
to have imposed an excessive burden on the applicant. Koufaki and Adedy v Greece, supra n. 45, para. 46; cf., 
M.E. Salomon, ‘Why Should it Matter that Others Have More: Poverty, Inequality and the Potential of 
International Human Rights Law’, 5 Review of International Studies 37 (2011) 2137. 
150 Koufaki and Adedy v  Greece, supra n. 45, paras. 31 and 48.  
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summon human rights vigilance.151 These may be unusual times but in important 
ways they are also deeply familiar times; and the future promises more not less 
supranational and international influence on the exercise of human rights. The 
policy responses to the economic crisis have foregrounded legal gaps when it 
comes to securing socio-economic rights protections across the various levels of 
external influence, surely now the time has come to see those gaps systematically 
closed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
151 See, G. Katrougalos, ‘The Greek Austerity Measures: Remedies under International Law’, International 
Journal of Constitutional Law Blog, 30 Jan. 2013, available at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/01/the-
greek-austerity-measures-remedies-under-international-law/. 
